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I will admit to needing little convincing, but “Are animals persons?” (Rowlands 2016) provided 
new ways to understand how animals qualify for the status. Rowlands begins by sketching out 
different ideas about personhood. He points out that it can refer to a legal sense, in which the 
status of person is enshrined in law, or a moral sense, in which a person is “the sort of thing to 
which a certain sort of moral consideration is owed.” His target article does not address these 
ideas about personhood, but instead focuses on personhood in a metaphysical sense. This refers 
to essential characteristics not encompassed by legal or moral conceptions of the person. One is 
a person in the metaphysical sense by virtue of possessing those characteristics. As for what 
these characteristics are, this is where Rowlands challenges existing assumptions. He explains 
that debates about personhood have long relied on John Locke’s definition, in which a person is 
“a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself the same 
thinking thing, in different times and places.” In sum, personhood requires both the existence of 
a mental life and the ability to recognize the contents of that life as part of the “same thinking 
thing” that has or is the life (Rowlands 2016: 2). In other words, the thinking being must 
recognize, as William James (1961) put it, “I am the same as I was yesterday … the Me of now 
and the Me of then are continuous” (68). 
 
A being’s ability to “consider itself” constitutes a form of self-awareness, a necessary condition 
for personhood. Any being that is not self-aware is not a person. Most humans qualify as 
persons in this sense, but debate about whether non-human animals also qualify persists. The 
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inability of many species to recognize themselves in mirrors purportedly demonstrates that they 
lack reflective self-awareness. In other words, they cannot have the thought that “the body in 
the mirror is identical with me.” Rowlands works his way around to resolving this, but first, he 
addresses the other part of Locke’s conception: a unified mental life. The sight of one’s image in 
the mirror must be somehow grouped with thoughts and states also seen as “belonging to me.” 
Seeing an object in the mirror and recognizing the object as oneself involves first-order 
processes. Personhood based on reflective self-awareness also requires higher-order processes 
that bind that recognition with other thoughts, perceptions, acts, and states together as 
belonging to me. This involves meta-cognition, or the ability to think about thinking. In this view, 
the thoughts, acts, and other processes belong together because of another thought that they 
belong together. However, this higher order thought is a different kind of thought than the 
others. According to Rowlands, we cannot answer the question of whether the various thoughts 
belong together by adding another thought, for we cannot know whether this thought even 
belongs with the others. We cannot explain the unity of thought by saying that it depends on 
another level of thought. Unity of thought cannot come from a higher order thought  “about” 
the others, for the additional order undoes the unity. 
 
Rowlands then suggests reconsidering what it means for a thinking being to “consider itself.” He 
proposes that the form of self-awareness involved in this process may not necessarily rely on 
higher-order meta-cognition. As an alternative, Rowlands makes a distinction between two 
different meanings of awareness. In the first case, if I say that I am aware of a book on my desk, 
the book’s presence on the desk is independent of my awareness of it. The book is on my desk 
regardless of whether I am thinking about it. In the second case, if I say that I am in pain, the 
pain is not independent of my awareness but is part of knowing the experience. The pain 
doesn’t exist apart from my awareness of it. My awareness in the second case is pre-reflective, 
built into the act of experiencing pain as pain. Knowing or experiencing something as something 
is not separate from the knowing or experiencing. In this sense, when a thinking being 
“considers itself,” the act of considering includes the awareness that the act is mine. The act 
indicates self-awareness; the knowing or experiencing as can only occur for the subject who 
knows or has the experiences. There is no additional step, no other level of thought required. In 
this way, pre-reflective awareness provides the unified mental life necessary for personhood. 
Evidence of pre-reflective awareness appears among animals; Rowlands uses the example of the 
dog who experiences another dog as familiar. A unified mental life means that animals qualify as 
persons.  
 
From a sociological perspective, two areas of research can add to the discussion. First, in 
addition to the legal, moral, and metaphysical senses, personhood is also a social 
accomplishment. Situations, interactions, and relationship provide the setting for the 
production of persons. The socially defined and publicly visible person can be teased apart from 
individuals’ reflective awareness of themselves (see Cahill 1998). Across history, many human 
groups have been denied the status, including Jews, African Americans, slaves, the intellectually 
disabled, and prisoners, just to name a few. Granted, they have also been denied legal and 
moral personhood, but the extent to which they have been deprived of the interactional 
Animal Sentience 2016.136:  Irvine on Rowlands on Animal Personhood 
 
 
3 
resources that enable the “collaborative manufacture” of the person depends on social context 
(Goffman 1967: 2).  
 
Beginning in the 1990s, a body of sociological literature began to apply this perspective to 
animals. Studies of interactions between caregivers and the mentally disabled (Pollner and 
McDonald-Wikler 1985; Bogdan and Taylor 1989) provided the basis for this work. For instance, in 
examining how family members assign personhood to the severely disabled, Bogdan and Taylor 
(1989) found that caregivers attribute thinking to the disabled person, granting him or her abilities 
to reason and understand. Non-disabled family members also consider the disabled person a 
partner in interaction, with his or her gestures, body postures, and facial expressions accomplishing 
what spoken language would otherwise have done. Family members also see the disabled as 
having their own preferences, feelings, and other characteristics. Moreover, they incorporate the 
disabled into household routines and rituals, and thus into the narrative history of the family. In 
this way, social interaction also provides the material through which the disabled attain the status 
of person.  
 
Clinton Sanders (1993, 1999) extended this to show how dog owners extend the status to their 
dogs. He found that owners saw their dogs as minded social actors who could act in ways that 
shaped their owners’ definitions of situations. Owners also saw their dogs as individuals and could 
easily describe what a particular dog “was like” (1993: 215). They saw their dogs as having a range 
of emotions and demonstrating sensitivity to emotions in others. In addition, they incorporated 
their dogs into household practices through mealtimes, opportunities for play and exercise, and 
into family rituals such as birthdays and holidays. Similarly, Steven and Janet Alger (1997) observed 
how cats took the role of the other, defined situations, chose courses of action, and demonstrated 
memories of past events. These analyses offer a clear sense of the social construction of 
personhood among animals through everyday interaction.  
 
Second, my own research on selfhood among companion animals meshes nicely with 
Rowlands’s discussion of pre-reflective awareness. As I understand it, this awareness presumes 
a self, which is part of experiencing as. In sociology, the self has long been reserved for human 
beings. This is our legacy from George Herbert Mead (1962), who declared spoken language as 
the barrier between humans and non-humans because it enables us to understand and 
communicate the symbols for self, such as our names and the names of other objects. Mead 
recognized that animals communicate but claimed that their interaction involves an instinctual 
“conversation of gestures,” such as when one dog growls at another who threatens to steal his 
bone or a cat hisses at a rival. Mead considered the “conversation of gestures” insignificant 
because it allegedly has only one meaning. The behavior of animals may be goal-directed, aimed at 
getting food, a mate, or defending territory, but it lacks the negotiated meaning that humans 
engage in through language. Because animals could not use language, Mead rendered them 
incapable of having meaningful social interaction, and therefore, lacking the selfhood that would 
emerge from that interaction. 
 
Relying on language eliminates many aspects of interaction that contribute to selfhood. Moreover, 
it restricts those who can possess selves to human beings. The flaws in Mead’s view are numerous, 
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and other scholars have reviewed them in detail (see Sanders and Arluke 1993; Myers 1998; 
Sanders 1999). If we grant that factors beyond spoken language matter for the creation of the self, 
then animals can participate in the process of self-making. To do so, they must themselves be 
subjects. How can we sense their subjectivity? As with other people, we cannot observe it directly. 
We perceive it during interaction. To illustrate how this takes place, I borrow ideas about the 
manifestation of self that originated with William James (1961) and were later applied to infants 
(see Stern 1985). Because infants lack the ability to use language, their experiences can be 
compared to those of (at least some) animals, who have similar brain structures and musculature. 
Whereas human development leads to language acquisition that adds to these basic experiences, 
the experiences themselves are preverbal. They consist of:  
 
(1) A sense of agency, meaning that you are the author of your actions and movements and 
not the author of the actions and movements of others; 
(2) A sense of coherence, meaning that you understand yourself as a physical whole that is 
the locus of agency;  
(3) A sense of affectivity, meaning that patterned qualities of feelings are associated with 
other experiences of the self; 
(4) A sense of self-history, meaning that you maintain some degree of continuity, even 
while changing. 
 
Human beings gain these experiences through interaction with others, beginning at birth. These 
four experiences not only underlie one’s own senses of subjective experience, they also form the 
basis for distinguishing self from other. Combined, these four preverbal experiences constitute a 
“core” self (see Stern 1985: 71) around which additional senses of self accrue. I offer brief examples 
of how these aspects of the core self manifest themselves among animals, drawing on my research 
on dogs and cats and the literature on other animals (Irvine 2004a, 2004b, 2007).  
 
Agency 
 
Agency implies subjectivity, in that an agentic being, by definition, has desires, wishes, and 
intentions, along with a sense of having those things. In other words, it is the actor’s awareness 
of having desires or wishes that is an element of selfhood, not simply having them. Agency also 
implies having control over one’s own actions (i.e., I can sit when I decide to, and if you push me 
into a chair, that is a different experience) and awareness of the felt consequences of those 
actions. For example, my intention to sit brings the felt consequence of sitting.  
 
Several indicators of agency appear in the first months of life, as babies begin reaching for 
objects and gaining hand-to-mouth skills. Infants around four months of age begin to use visual 
information to shape the fingers to accommodate objects of particular sizes. Because agency 
does not depend on language, it is feasible among other species. Some of the best examples of 
animals’ agency come from the arena of dog training, even at the beginner’s level. As Sanders 
(1999) explains, trainers teach dogs to exercise self-control. This implies that the dog recognizes 
that he or she can initiate action, since in order to control one’s self one must first have a sense of 
will or volition. In my research at an animal shelter, I saw frequent examples of this when staff 
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members sought to make under-socialized dogs more adoptable. A typical case involved a young, 
mixed-breed dog who jumped up on the gate of his kennel and barked wildly for attention 
whenever anyone came near, making most potential adopters think twice. The key to modifying 
the dog’s behavior was to change his understanding of the cause of the rewards he receives. A dog 
who jumps up on his kennel and barks receives two kinds of rewards. To the extent that the 
behavior is self-directed (i.e., aimed at releasing energy), it is constantly rewarding. However, to the 
extent that the behavior is directed at others, as an attempt to gain their attention, there is only a 
probabilistic chance of reward. As long as the reward of attention depends upon others, it will be 
unpredictable. The dog does not control it. The only thing he controls (or should) is his behavior. 
We had to make the dog understand how to increase the probability of rewards from others. To do 
so, we removed him from the adoption area for a few days to reduce the foot traffic past his 
kennel. We scheduled regular exercise to reduce his need for the jumping. Most importantly, we 
stopped reinforcing his bad behavior. We paid attention to him only when he stood quietly. If he 
got up on his hind legs or barked, we moved away from his kennel. Because he had released some 
pent-up energy through exercise, the reward of attention became a higher priority. Moreover, 
because attention depended on others, he soon learned to control himself to get it. This subtle act 
of behavior modification helped the dog distinguish self from other by distinguishing different 
reinforcement schedules. Infants develop this ability as early as three months of age; the same 
probably holds for other highly social animals, with similar implications for discriminating self from 
other. 
 
Coherence 
 
If agency provides a sense of self versus other then coherence provides the boundaries of the self. 
Coherence gives agency somewhere to “live.” Several indicators of coherence are independent of 
language, making them likely in non-human animals. According to the infancy research, the 
capacity to recognize distinct others, such as primary care-givers, becomes available at two or three 
months of age. Animals, too, can recognize distinct others. People who regularly work with certain 
animals find that animals quickly begin to recognize them. More relevant for the discussion of 
coherence is how animals understand that parts of people belong together. For example, during 
my research, I had regular contact with a dog who required several surgeries. I often restrained him 
while a technician drew blood and I sat with him as he woke up after his first surgery. When he 
recovered and became available for adoption, other people also worked with him, but whenever 
he saw me, he brightened up. One day, when an E-collar obscured his vision, I approached him 
from behind as he stood next to two other people. As I passed, I greeted them. As I did, the dog’s 
tail wagged and he turned as if to confirm that the physical form matched the familiar voice.  
 
Although some might dismiss this as a conditioned response (i.e., my voice had been programmed 
into his behavioral repertoire), another example is less easily dismissed. Animals demonstrate 
coherence in the act of hiding, which requires a sense of self as an object to conceal from others. 
Hiding “shows an awareness that the ‘embodied self’ is in danger and that concealment is in order” 
(Sanders 1999: 137; see also Allen and Bekoff 1997). Cats, having evolved as skilled predators, 
relied on the ability to hide in order to hunt. Janet and Steven Alger (2003) found that cats adapt 
their hiding into games of hide-and-seek (58).  
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Affectivity 
 
Another dimension of the core self is the capacity for emotions, which not only indicate pleasure 
and displeasure, but also connect the previous two self-experiences. If agency refers to experiences 
of self as the initiator of actions, and coherence locates those actions within an embodied entity, 
then affectivity refers to the ability not only to experience emotions but also to associate emotions 
with the other aspects of self. Affectivity assigns “ownership” to an action and its associated 
internal state. For instance, in face-to-face play involving mother and child, the child smiles or 
makes a face and the mother reacts with laughter or mock surprise. The child, experiencing 
pleasure at the mother’s response, repeats the gesture to elicit the same emotional experience. 
Although the mother participates in the activities, the feeling “belongs” to the child. The research 
on infant development has identified signs of this capacity between three and six months of age. 
 
It is now widely accepted that animals experience emotions. Dogs and cats experience surprise, 
contentment, fear, frustration, boredom, and joy, just to start the list. They form close bonds, 
suggesting affection and perhaps even love. Other animals also experience emotions, and research 
has grown steadily in recent decades. For example, orphaned elephants grieve and experience 
post-traumatic stress (Bradshaw et al. 2005; Poole 1998) and ravens fall in love (Heinrich 1991). 
Evidence suggests that animals can also associate feelings with distinct experiences and understand 
that they are the source of the feelings, thus suggesting the constellation of agency, coherence, 
and affectivity of a core self. For example, in 2012, a popular video showed a crow sledding on a jar 
lid. The bird slid down a rooftop on the lid, dragged it back to the top, and went down a second 
time before the close of the one-minute video. This exemplifies the solitary activity known as 
object play. Most birds and mammals engage in it (Bekoff and Byers 1998), as do some reptiles, 
such as turtles (Burghardt 1998), and even octopuses (Mather and Anderson 1999). Although we 
cannot say how the bird labeled the experience, he or she clearly enjoyed it. Judging by the effort 
taken to repeat it, the bird knew that he or she was the source of the experience. 
 
Self-History 
 
A sense of continuity, made possible by memory, completes the constellation of core self-
experiences. Memory preserves the meaning of events, objects, and others, and their associated 
emotions. Memory begins to operate very early in life. Among infants, motor memory enables 
them to learn to sit up and to suck a thumb, and perceptual and affective memory allows them to 
recognize familiar faces or toys and to smile upon doing so. The memory required for self-history is 
preverbal, and several aspects of it appear in animals. Anyone who has ever taken a dog or cat to 
the veterinarian knows that animals remember places. Skeptics might say that the animal “just 
smells fear,” dismissing the reaction as instinctual. However, even if it were “only” instinct, 
consistently registering a particular emotion in a setting nevertheless implies a sense of continuity.  
 
In addition to the veterinarian’s office, others have documented animals’ “place memory” (Lerman 
1996; Sanders 1999; Alger and Alger 2003). Indeed, Kenneth Shapiro (1990, 1997) suggests that the 
lives of dogs are oriented in terms of place, rather than time, as ours are. Feline examples abound 
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in the work of Steven and Janet Alger (1997, 2003). In their research in the cat shelter, they 
observed that the cats designated certain places such as cage tops and beds as “not just 
comfortable places for sleeping, but also safe places to relax, to find intimacy with others, and to 
explore their need for affection” (2003: 110). The sheltered cats learned to define these areas in 
the same terms, suggesting a coherent system of memory created through symbolic interaction.  
 
A behaviorist would characterize these examples not as memory, but as simple conditioned 
responses. Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff (1997) make a distinction that is useful in this context. They 
distinguish between behavior that is “stimulus bound,” meaning an invariable (or nearly so) 
response to external stimuli, and behavior that is “stimulus free,” or motivated by internal factors 
(56-62). When external factors predominate over internal factors, behaviorist explanations are 
preferred. However, in many instances, behaviorist conclusions have been drawn from research 
that ignores or disregards internal factors. For example, many laboratory studies of allegedly 
stimulus-bound behaviors must modify conditions so that animals will be sufficiently motivated to 
perform according to behaviorist expectations. This is especially the case in experiments involving 
food rewards, in which researchers must keep animals motivated to eat even when internal 
responses perceive satiation. In such cases, stimulus-bound conclusions are drawn from behaviors 
that would under normal circumstances be stimulus free. To use an example closer to home, two 
of my cats regularly sleep on a fleece blanket. It is not stretching the point to say that they find this 
particular blanket comforting. This comfort has been to some degree conditioned. Nevertheless, if I 
were to produce the same blanket during an examination at the veterinarian’s office, neither cat 
would respond with kneading and napping. The behavioral explanation becomes inadequate in 
contexts that involve various inputs. They require a more complex explanation, and the possibility 
of memory seems a reasonable alternative.  
 
At the end of his target article, Rowlands suggests, “instead of thinking of all the ways in which 
animals might not be persons, or juggling with one’s conception of a person to ensure that 
animals are disqualified, it might be more fruitful instead to think of the ways in which they are” 
(16). Thinking about personhood in terms of collaborative manufacture, and the self in terms of the 
capacities outlined here, responds to this suggestion. Extending person- and selfhood to animals 
does not equate persons with humans. It leaves room to acknowledge that our experiences differ 
from those of other animals in degree rather than kind. Humans develop selves that allow us to 
accomplish interactions that animals cannot undertake — and vice versa. Non-human animals 
develop the capacities that matter for their social lives. It would be as unfair to measure human 
experience by a dog’s or an elephant’s capacities as it would be to measure canine or elephant 
experience in human terms. Yet that is precisely what we have done in denying them personhood. I 
applaud Rowlands for leveling the playing field to include all conscious beings. 
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